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The “Great Moderation” in a Dual Exchange
Rate Regime∗
Sven W. Arndt
Abstract
In the early nineties, the U.S. economy was emerging from a brief slump, monetary policy was
easy, and economic activity recovered quickly during the decade, with GDP eventually reaching
and then passing the consensus full employment level. Yet aggregate inflation remained surpris-
ingly subdued. This moderation in prices at the aggregate level persuaded policy makers to allow
the easy-money stance to continue in spite of the presence of inflation in non-tradables and in
housing and construction in particular. This paper uses a flex-price, mixed-exchange rate model to
examine some of the major contributing factors to economic developments in the two-decade pe-
riod that ended in the financial meltdown and the great recession. It argues that Chinese exchange
rate manipulation and China’s preference for holding dollar reserves were important contributing
factors. On the U.S. side, failure to understand the importance of differencial inflation patterns in
tradables and non-tradables sectors, and especially failure to see inflation in housing and construc-
tion as goods rather than asset inflation, allowed monetary expansion to last much longer than it
should have.
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1.  Introduction  
 
For two decades or more, the United States has operated within a dual exchange 
rate regime consisting of floating rates with the majority of its trading partners 
and a fixed rate with the Chinese yuan and a handful of other currencies.  This de 
facto regime contrasts sharply with the de jure IMF classification of the U.S. as an 
independent floater.1  This classification is an accurate description of U.S. policy 
and practice, because the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) unilaterally manipulates 
movements in the bilateral exchange rate.  This reality has important implications 
for macro adjustment and stability in the U.S. economy.   
It is well-known that the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies 
depends on the nature of the exchange rate regime.  But what is known about this 
issue has generally been explored in terms of models in which “the” exchange 
rate is either fixed or floating, rather than one in which both regimes exist side by 
side.   The issue of policy efficacy in a dual-rate regime has been explored in two 
recent papers, the first examining the implications of China’s fixing in a short-run, 
sticky-price Mundell-Fleming model (Arndt, 2010), and the second in a medium-
run, flex-price model (Arndt, 2011).   
 The present discussion uses the flex-price model to explore the extent to 
which these exchange rate arrangements may have contributed to recent 
developments from the “great moderation” to the financial melt-down and the 
“great recession.”  A plausible case can be made that the dual exchange rate 
regime played an important role in shaping those developments, but a full 
explanation depends on the presence of other factors as well, including the 
sectoral structure of the U.S. economy, the nature of foreign competition, and 
policy makers’ interpretations of and reactions to key economic indicators.       
 The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 applies the model to the de jure 
case in which the dollar floats against both the euro and the yuan.  The results 
provide a convenient benchmark against which to compare the dual rate regime in 
Section 3. Section 4 introduces and examines additional contributing factors.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Fully Floating Rates Everywhere 
 
In this flex-price version of the model there are three countries: the United States 
and trading partners China and the Eurozone.  Capital mobility is assumed to be 
high between the U.S. and Europe, but low between the U.S. and China.  The 
main features of the model are captured by equilibrium conditions for the goods 
                                                 
1
 See IMF (2008).  See also Frankel and Wei (2007) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). 
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and services sector, for the money market, and for the two bilateral payments 
balances.    
 
The Basic Model 
 
The real economy (henceforth the “goods market”) is described by the GG 
equation: 
  I(rexp) + T(y, y*, yc, e*, ec) – S(y) = - G,                 (1) 
where real investment expenditure (I) depends negatively on the expected real 
interest rate rexp = i – πexp, defined as the difference between the nominal rate (i) 
and the expected inflation rate.  The overall trade balance or current account (T) is 
related negatively to real home GDP (y) and positively to real GDP in the 
Eurozone (y*) and China (yc), and positively related to the dollar’s real exchange 
rates with the euro (e*) and yuan (ec).  The real exchange rate is defined as ei = 
Ei.Pi/P, where Ei represents the respective bilateral nominal exchange rates, Pi the 
respective foreign price indexes, and P the equivalent U.S. price index. 
 The money market is represented by a standard liquidity-preference 
function (LL): 
  H/P = L(y, i),                (2) 
where H is high-powered money and real money demand (L) is positively related 
to income and negatively to the nominal interest rate on non-monetary assets (i). 
 Under floating rates, the two bilateral current account balances are defined 
as follows: 
  T*(y, y*, e*) + K*(i, i*) = 0 and             (3) 
  Tc(y, yc, ec) + Kc(i, ic) = 0,                          (4) 
where Ki represents capital flows into the U.S. which rise with i and fall with 
foreign interest rates.   
 Price flexibility is represented by a positively sloped “aggregate supply” 
curve, 
  P = P(y/yf),                (5) 
where yf is the natural-rate or NAIRU level of domestic real GDP.  
 The last equation plays an important role in the cyclical adjustment 
process.  When the output gap is large and/or prices are sticky, as in the short-run 
Mundell-Fleming model (Arndt, 2011), output responds to aggregate demand and 
can be increased without serious price repercussions. As the gap between actual 
and potential (or NAIRU) GDP shrinks, however, additional output can be 
obtained only at increasing cost.  Hence, the trade-off between prices and output 
(Py) worsens as resource utilization pushes against the limits of the economy’s 
capacity.   
 Figure 1 presents a pictorial view of the de jure U.S. exchange rate regime 
of floating rates with all trading partners.  It is the regime that U.S. policy makers 
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prefer, as evidenced by their continuing pressure on China to allow the yuan to 
float.  Equations (1), (2), (3), and (4) are represented in the figure by curves GG, 
LL, B*B*, and BcBc, respectively.  The B*B* curve has a relatively flat slope, 
reflecting the assumption of high capital mobility between the U.S. and the 
Eurozone.  The steeper balance of payments function for China represents low 
capital mobility. 
 
A monetary expansion shifts the LL curve out in Figure 1.  Restoration of 
“internal” balance requires a rise in income and decline in the interest rate, given 
at the intersection of the new L1L1 curve with the original G0G0 curve.  As U.S. 
GDP rises, imports rise and the trade balance deteriorates with respect to both 
countries.  As interest rates fall, capital outflows cause both financial accounts to 
deteriorate, causing the dollar to depreciate against both currencies. Depreciation 
shifts the GG, B*B*, and BcBc curves out and to the right, giving monetary policy 
the “turbo” charge celebrated in the open-economy literature. 
 In this model, inflation is stoked by currency depreciation and by internal 
cost pressures resulting from a shrinking output gap.  An increase in the price 
3
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level reduces the real money supply and thus would shift the L1L1 curve to the 
left.  It would also shift the G1G1 curve and the B1*B1* and B1cB1c curves to the 
left.  Clearly, domestic inflation reduces the real depreciation associated with a 
given nominal depreciation.  As inflation pushes the relevant curves inward, the 
effectiveness of a given monetary injection is reduced.  The efficacy of monetary 
policy varies with the economy’s position relative to full employment. 
 Under full floating, therefore, an easy-money policy at the beginning of 
the period following the short recession of the early nineties would have been 
very effective in raising economic activity and reducing unemployment, because 
the policy-induced depreciation of the dollar against all currencies, including the 
yuan, would have given the policy an extra boost.  As the period progressed and 
the U.S. economy recovered, continued monetary laxity would have started to 
raise prices as the system approached capacity levels.  Rising costs and prices in 
the U.S. would more and more have negated the benefits of easy-money policy 
itself and of nominal dollar depreciation.  There would also have been some 
deterioration of the U.S. current account balance.  
In the discussion thus far, policy makers have been assumed to target 
monetary aggregates. In the modern era, however, many central banks have 
shifted to interest-rate and inflation targeting.  Such a policy regime may be 
represented in Figure 1 by a horizontal LL curve, with the federal funds rate 
pegged and thus exogenous and money supply endogenous. A monetary 
expansion then means reduction in the target interest rate, which shifts the LL 
curve down and causes output and employment to expand.  As before, rising 
prices at high levels of employment diminish the effectiveness of the low-interest 
policy by reducing the real value of a given nominal quantity of money, but the 
resulting upward pressure on market interest rates forces the central bank to 
continually raise the nominal quantity of money.  
It may be assumed that the presence of domestic inflation and nominal 
dollar depreciation would have been taken by policy makers as important signs of 
an overheating economy.  Certainly, a central bank following a Taylor-Rule 
policy with an inflation target would be compelled to shift to a restrictive policy 
stance by virtue of both the rising inflation and the shrinking output gap.  If such a 
central bank had nominal exchange-rate stability as an additional target, then the 
ongoing depreciation of the currency would have raised an additional warning 
flag.       
 
3.  China Fixes; the Euro Floats 
  
The foregoing provides a scenario for the hypothetical case of a U.S. exchange 
rate regime that matches the IMF’s de jure classification.  In Figure 2, a suitably 
amended version of the model is used to examine adjustment under the 
4
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arrangements that were actually in place during the period.  All previous 
equations continue to hold, except that equation (4) is now rewritten to take 
account of Chinese foreign exchange intervention.  
  T(y, yc, ec) + Kc (i, ic) + Rc = 0,           (4a) 
where Rc stands for dollar reserves held by the central bank of China. 
 As before, a U.S. monetary expansion shifts out the L0L0 curve.  While 
internal balance once again moves to the point where the new LL curve intersects 
the initial G0G0 curve, the two balances of payments are once again in deficit 
there.  The dollar again depreciates, but only against the euro, causing the G0G0 
and B0*B0* curves to shift to the right and tending to strengthen the effectiveness 
of the monetary expansion.  Note that the right-ward shift of the GG curve is 
unambiguously smaller than before, indicating that fixing the yuan reduces the 
efficacy of monetary stimulus relative to the case of universal floating. 
 With the dollar-yuan rate fixed, the bilateral current account deficit 
between the U.S. and the People’s Republic persists and the central bank of China 
is obliged to intervene and mop up the excess of dollars looking for yuan.  The 
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dashed BcBc curve represents overall equilibrium in the balance of payments with 
China, that is, balance in the sum of autonomous and official reserve transactions.  
The Chinese central bank’s intervention pulls dollars out of circulation and thus 
has the effect of taking some liquidity back out of the system and undermining the 
ability of monetary policy to narrow the output gap.  
 That, at least, would be the case under a standard fixed-rate system in 
which the home central bank did the intervening. In the present case, however, the 
foreign central bank uses intervention dollars to purchase U.S. Treasury securities 
in the open market and thereby recycles lost liquidity back into the system. In 
other words, China’s intervention prevents the fixed-rate adjustment mechanism 
from working properly and makes the bilateral payments deficit “permanent.”2   
 Up to this point, China’s recycling has helped make the Fed’s stimulus 
stick.  As before, however, price pressures will develop as the economy’s 
expansion matures. One source of price inflation is depreciation of the dollar 
against the euro and the consequent rise in prices of imports from the Eurozone.  
Another comes from domestic cost pressures as the U.S. output gap declines.  A 
domestic price increase shifts the LL, GG and external-balance curves left, 
reducing the effectiveness of the easy-money policy.  Note that although the 
nominal dollar-yuan rate is fixed, price inflation in the U.S. causes the dollar to 
appreciate against the yuan in real terms.           
  
4. Additional Considerations 
 
 The argument thus far suggests that Chinese exchange-rate policies made 
a material difference to economic developments during the period under review.  
Other factors, however, also played an important role. 
  
Prices in a Globalized Economy  
 
In the early part of the period, overall price pressures in the U.S. were 
astoundingly moderate.  They were an important feature of what became known 
as the “great moderation.”  An important source of price moderation was the 
yuan-dollar peg.  But even with floating rates – such as the euro-dollar rate, the 
extent of pass-through can be quite low, especially in the United States, where 
many of the country’s imports are priced in dollars.  Price moderation was further 
supported by the ability of China’s large economy to supply vast quantities of a 
broad range of products at stable prices.    
                                                 
2
 The causes of global trade imbalances have been a major item on economists’ and policy 
makers’ research agendas.  For samples from a fairly extensive literature, see Bernanke (2005), 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009), Borio (2011) and Andolfatto (2012). 
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 As the U.S. expansion matured, however, the output gap fell and 
employment reached and then surpassed natural-rate levels.  In our model, wages, 
other factor prices and costs generally begin to rise as actual output approaches 
full employment, with the rate of price increase itself rising steadily. Industries 
producing tradables are limited by foreign competition in their ability to pass cost 
increases through to higher prices. The current account deteriorates.  In industries 
producing non-tradable goods and services, including health care, education, 
residential structures, commercial property and construction services, 
international trade is a less potent source of price moderation.  One channel, 
however, along which trade may provide some cost moderation is through 
stability in prices of tradable parts and components used in the production of non-
tradable goods and services. 
 In general, however, non-tradables firms are able to pass cost increases 
through to higher prices. As they seek to attract workers, capital and other 
productive resources in a high-employment economy, those resources can only 
come from the tradables sectors.  This competition for factors of production 
spreads wage and cost inflation through the whole economy.  Thus, output 
expansion in non-tradables comes increasingly at the expense of tradables 
production.  
 These developments – price inflation in non-tradables, a shrinking 
tradables sector, rising offshore sourcing and production, and a worsening current 
account – were not properly understood at the time.  The shrinkage of jobs in U.S. 
manufacturing and in other tradables, for example, was blamed on unfair 
competition, especially by China.  While this accusation was not entirely 
incorrect, it was too simplistic.    
      
Stock-Flow Adjustment in Asset Markets 
 
Two developments occurred toward the middle and end of the period, which are 
not typically covered in open-economy macro analysis.  They were the asset price 
booms of the dot.com era in the middle of the period and the real estate boom of 
the housing bubble toward the end of the period.  Rapid increases in the value of 
financial or real assets create capital gains, which wealth owners may decide to 
cash in so as to increase consumption expenditures.  When they do so, 
governments collect capital gains taxes, which they often promptly spend on 
increased outlays. During the dot.com years, for example, many states ran 
unexpected budget surpluses and ended up committing some of these windfall 
gains to long-run expenditure programs such as reducing class-room size and 
hiring teachers.   
 The model represented in Figure 2, is easily adapted to include wealth 
effects. A wealth-driven rise in private and public expenditures shifts the GG 
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curve to the right, thereby adding to the expansionary forces pushing the economy 
forward.  In the dot.com boom, wealth owners cashed in corporate shares; in the 
housing boom, they cashed in home equity in order to finance additional 
expenditures on goods and services.  With wealth increasing rapidly, there was 
little need to “save,” that is, withhold current income from current consumption.  
Indeed, by the end of the period, the household saving rate in the U.S. had 
dropped close to zero.  In retrospect it would seem that these developments should 
have raised eyebrows among policy makers, but there would have been little in 
the macro policy literature to guide them. 
 There was a debate about whether so-called asset price bubbles should be 
of concern to policy makers.  In thinking about this question, it is helpful to recall 
the familiar stock-flow distinction of economic analysis.  At any point in time, 
there exists a stock of assets, be it corporate shares, government bonds or 
residential property.  An increase in demand for existing stocks simply raises 
prices, increasing wealth in the manner discussed above.  Over time, however, 
stocks are increased by new supply flowing into the system.  As governments 
fund new expenditures by issuing debt, or corporations fund new investment by 
issuing equity, stocks of securities rise.  In the case of residential and other types 
of property, construction of new houses, office buildings and factories adds to the 
existing real stock. 
 In these examples, the flow supply of financial instruments funds new 
expenditures of one type or another, injecting additional demand for productive 
resources into the system.  In a high-employment economy, additions to overall 
demand for labor and capital cannot fail to raise wages and production costs 
throughout the economy.  For policy makers, therefore, the trick is to distinguish 
the part that is pure asset inflation from the part that raises aggregate demand for 
productive resources. In this respect, U.S. policy makers failed rather 
significantly, although it must be said in fairness that there was not much to guide 
them in the macro policy literature. 
 
Do Expectations Matter?          
 
Expectations clearly played a powerful role throughout the period, but especially 
during the go-go years of the dot.com and housing booms.  In models of the 
present type, expectations have received critical attention in the context of Lucas-
type expectations-augmented aggregate supply curves and in covered and 
uncovered interest-arbitrage in foreign exchange markets.  In the period in 
question, however, price expectations were far more complex than is typically 
assumed in those applications.  One degree of complexity arises readily from the 
separation of tradable and non-tradable goods and services, which allows markets 
to form distinct expectations about prices in the two respective sectors.  In the 
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period under review, a plausible mix of expectations would have been low 
inflation in tradables and high inflation in non-tradables.  While the deflator in 
equation (2) would probably be some weighted average of the two prices, other 
decision variables might be deflated by the relevant sectoral price instead.  
 Consider, for example, one specific possibility in equation (1).  For given 
expected returns on investment, the Fed’s easy-money policy moves the system 
down along the GG curve, as we have seen.  A rise in expected returns on 
investment shifts the curve out.  A housing bubble, for instance, in which 
investors expect higher future prices, raises the demand for existing as well as 
new housing.  The demand for new housing shifts GG out, adding to the overall 
demand boom.  In general, the combination of easy credit and low interest rates, 
on the one hand, and expectations of rapidly rising equity values or house prices 
go a long way to explaining the unprecedented degree of leveraging that occurred 
at all levels of the economy. Of course, when the bubble collapses, and prices fall 
and are expected to fall further, the GG curve contracts, suggesting again that an 
asset-price boom can have non-trivial implications for the real economy. 
  
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In the period of the “great moderation,” both tradables and non-tradables prices 
rose, but inflation in the former was mild for the reasons discussed in the 
preceding sections.  During the high-employment stages of the epoch, the relative 
price of non-tradables would be expected to rise in order to facilitate the inter-
sectoral transfer of productive resources.   
 The combination of inflation in non-tradables prices, steadily worsening 
current account deficits, increased offshore sourcing and production, and job 
losses in many tradables industries was widely observed by policy makers, media, 
and market analysts, but the possible causal linkage to U.S. monetary policy never 
became a compelling consideration.  The housing bubble, widely interpreted as 
asset inflation, was expected to deflate on its own without significant 
consequences for the rest of the economy.          
 Overall, therefore, it seems reasonable to assign some of the blame for 
those two momentous decades to China’s exchange-rate manipulation.  But it is 
clear, as well, that the easy-money policy lasted much too long and that U.S. 
policy makers made flawed judgments in their interpretation of key economic 
indicators. 
 This raises a question reminiscent of the old debate about rules vs. 
discretion in central bank policy making.  If the Fed was following a Taylor Rule, 
a yellow light would have told it to slow down when actual output reached the 
consensus full employment level. Perhaps the reality of the great price moderation 
was enough to allow officials to discount the relevance of the warning signal, 
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which in itself raises questions about the extent to which the two right-hand-side 
variables in the Rule are truly independent. A second question arises over the 
usefulness of an aggregate inflation measure as the primary or sole indicator of 
overheating.  In an open economy with significant links to global markets more 
attention might have to be paid to inflation in non-tradables and to designing 
better measures of economy-wide cost pressures.    
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